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On the Characteristics of BGP Multiple Origin AS
Conflicts
Kwan-Wu Chin
School of Electrical, Computer and Telecommunications Engineering
University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue, NSW, Australia
kwanwu@uow.edu.au
Abstract— The Internet has thousands of autonomous
systems (ASs), each advertising one or more prefixes it
owns. According to RFC 1930, each prefix should originate
from a single AS. However, routing updates involving
multiple ASs advertising reachability to a given prefix, so
called multiple origin AS conflict (MOAS), are becoming
prevalent. To this end, this paper analyzes and quantifies
MOAS conflicts observed in routing updates collected over
21 days in January 2007, and presents ten reasons that
explain why they occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)[9] is the de-facto
inter-domain routing protocol used to link autonomous
systems (ASs). Each AS has a consistent routing policy,
and uses BGP to connect its routers to other ASs. These
routers exchange reachability information with other
routers, and populate their respective routing table with
the best paths to various networks on the Internet. An
example reachability information is, 66.85.252.0/22 →
[2905 701 6305]. The term on the right denotes the path
vector of a given prefix. Each AS that has connectivity to
the prefix/network adds its unique AS number to the path
vector before forwarding the reachability information to
its neighboring ASs. Hence, from the path vector, a
router can easily determine the list of ASs packets will
have to traverse through in order to reach the network
66.85.252.0/22. Moreover, the router can determine the
AS that owns a given prefix, so called origin AS, by
accessing the last AS on the path vector. For the prefix
66.88.252.0/22, its owner is AS 6305.
In this paper, we are interested in prefixes that orig-
inate from two or more origin ASs, so called multiple
origin AS (MOAS) prefixes. In other words, more than
one ASs claiming to be the owner of a given prefix.
Take for example the following two reachability infor-
mation, 68.254.214.0/24 → [12682 3491 7132 32380]
and 68.254.214.0/24 → [2905 701 12026]. These two
reachability information imply that the prefix/network
68.254.214.0/24 is located in the ASs 32380 and 12026.
Hence, they these ASs do not adhere to RFC 1930
[3], which recommends that a prefix originates from
one AS only. Unfortunately, in practice, this is not
true. Therefore, it is important that we analyze MOAS
conflicts, and understand why they occur. More so when
their occurrences affect traffic flows. and hence routers’
load.
This paper is structured as follows. We first present
related works in Section II and highlight how our work
extends Zhao et al. [10]’s seminal work on MOAS
conflicts. Then, in Section III, we present our research
methodology followed by characteristics of MOAS con-
flicts detected over 21 days. In Section IV, we present
causes of MOAS conflicts, followed by our conclusions
and future works in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
This paper revisits Zhao et al. [10]’s 2001 work, and
presents updated results on the prevalence and charac-
teristics of MOAS conflicts. We repeated most of Zhao
et al.’s experiments, and also study MOAS conflicts with
origin ASs located in different countries. From these
experiments, we compare the results obtained in 2001
and 2007, and provide additional reasons that lead to
MOAS conflicts.
After Zhao et al.’s work, researchers have developed
methods to quickly detect whether a MOAS conflict is
due to prefix hijack. This problem is particular critical
given that Ballani et al. [1] recently showed that hi-
jacking a prefix without disrupting traffic flow is pos-
sible. Readers interested in these methods are referred
to [4][11], and their references. This paper however is
focused on quantifying MOAS conflicts, and analyzing
scenarios that lead to their occurrences, which could be
due to reasons other than prefix hijack.
Apart from the aforementioned works, Huston [6]
runs a web-site that automatically generates daily reports
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containing statistics related to BGP, one of which is
multiple origin prefixes, aka MOAS conflicts. However,
the site does not include reasons for these conflicts.
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
To study MOAS conflicts, we use BGP route updates
collected by RouteViews1. Specifically, we process BGP
updates dumped by the Oregon Internet Exchange (IX)
from midnight on the following dates: 1-January-2007
to 21-January-2007. These updates amount to 1943
compressed snapshots totalling 756 MByte in size. We
process each snapshot for prefixes and record their origin
AS. Besides that, we record the lifetime of a given prefix.
Lastly, we use the WHOIS service to obtain the owner’s
name of a given prefix and AS number.
A. General
The total number of prefixes observed in the dumped
BGP updates is 239,747, with 2,945 prefixes classified as
MOAS conflict. Note, we removed reachability informa-
tion with AS sets, 46 in total, from our results. Figures 1
and 2 show the number and proportion of prefixes with
MOAS conflicts over the 21 days. The first day recorded
757 prefixes, however this number drops significantly
with each passing day. In other words, with each passing
day, the number of new conflicts decreases. This implies
that most of conflicts are long-lived.
From Figure 2, we can see that the number of prefixes
with conflicts only constitutes a small percentage of the
total number of prefixes advertised each day. Bear in
mind that the number of prefixes advertised for each
snapshot varies. Interestingly, the number of conflicts is
more than twice that of the total recorded in the year
2001 [10]. Apart from that, when we plot prefix lengths,
see Figure 3, we find that the most popular prefixes are
24 bits in length or /24, followed by those with lengths
/18 to /23. This is consistent with the results from [10],
but we observe more prefixes with lengths /18 to /23.
B. Distribution of Origin ASs
Figure 4 shows that most of the 2,945 prefixes are
advertised by two ASs. Interestingly, there is a prefix
advertised by 13 ASs! Upon closer inspection, this prefix
turns out to be the 6to4 anycast relay router prefix,
192.88.99.0/24 [5]. We will elaborate further on other
possible causes of MOAS conflicts in Section IV.
1http://www.routeviews.org
























Fig. 1. Number of unique prefixes with MOAS conflicts over 21
days.





































Fig. 2. Percentage of prefixes in conflicts.
C. Path Characteristics
Another question of interest is the number of prefixes
that have unique paths. In other words, those that do not
share any common ASs. Figure 5 shows that the path
vector of 1007 prefixes are unique. Also shown are the
paths with at least one, two, etc ASs in common. Apart
from that, 31 of them have one of the conflicting origin
AS functioning as a transit AS. This usually occurs due
to traffic engineering purposes [10]. Note, we remove
the AS which the collector is in before comparing paths
for a given prefix. Otherwise, the number of paths with
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Fig. 3. Distribution of prefix lengths.
























Fig. 4. Number of ASs advertising a prefix.
one common AS will be a lot higher since the same AS
may have been used to collect route updates.
D. ASs Countries
An interesting question is to determine the location
of ASs advertising reachability to a given prefix. If both
ASs are located in the same country, it is likely they
have a peering arrangement over a link that does not run
BGP. This is particularly true if both conflicting ASs
are located in the same state or city. However, if they
are located in different countries, then there is cause for
concerns.
In total, there are 98 prefixes with origin ASs located
in different countries. Figure 6 depicts the countries
involved in advertising a prefix. For example, there are
ASs in the US and China advertising the same prefix.
There are also ASs in India and Bahrain originating
the same prefix. From the figure, we can also quickly


























Fig. 5. Number of common ASs in paths.
identify prefixes that warrant more investigations. For
example, there is an edge between China (CN) and
South Africa (SA). After further investigations, we found
that an AS in China and South Africa is advertising
ChinaNet’s prefix 61.152.241.0, and it is unclear why a
South African AS would be advertising the prefix. Lastly,
notice that countries that are close by are well connected,
especially those in Europe. Therefore, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the detected MOAS conflicts from
these countries are valid or invalid since the ASs involved
may have a non-BGP link.
E. Conflicts Lifetime
Finally, we investigated the lifetime of prefixes. That
is, we record the time when a prefix is first announced
to the time it is withdrawn. Interestingly, all the detected
MOAS conflicts have very short average lifetime. In fact,
only 13.25 hours. This agrees with [10]’s observation,
and it is unclear why MOAS conflicts are short-lived
given that a majority of them are due to multi-homing.
That is, they serve as backup or are used for traffic
engineering purposes. Hence, logically they should be
up for a longer period of time. This remains a future
research question.
IV. EXPLANATIONS
The following sections outline key reasons that cause
MOAS conflicts.
A. Anycasting
Anycasting is one of the many reasons that causes
MOAS conflicts. The best example is the 6to4 anycast
relay router prefix, 192.88.99.0/24 [5]. This prefix is ad-

































Fig. 6. Location of ASs causing MOAS conflicts. An edge indicates that at least one prefix have been advertised by an AS located in
the countries connected by the edge. Note, the name corresponding to each country code can be resolved using http://www.iana.org/root-
whois/index.html.



















Fig. 7. Average Lifetime of Prefixes
router that can provide transit to IPv6 networks. Apart
from that, we find that content distribution networks
also employ anycasting. Examples include Akamai2 and
HighWinds3, which we assume use anycasting to redirect
traffic to their nearest networks/servers, thereby enabling
2http://www.akamai.net
3http://www.highwinds.com
fast and localized data delivery to their customers.
B. Internet Exchanges
Another cause of MOAS conflicts is due to ASs
advertising IX prefixes. From our results in Section
III-B, we found the two prefixes that originated from
five ASs, 198.32.176.0 and 206.223.115.0, correspond
to IX addresses. For example, 206.223.1165.0 belongs
to Equinix Inc., which is a major IX provider. Similarly,
for the eight prefixes that originated from four different
ASs, three of them belong to IXs.
C. Multi-National Companies
A multi-national company may advertise its prefix
from countries it has offices in. For example, Glenayre
Technologies has a subsidiary in China, called Glenayre
Electronics, which uses the same prefix as its parent
office in the US. To ensure reachability to all offices,
ISPs in China and the US advertise a route to Glenayre
Technologies’ prefix. Having such configuration clearly
reduces latency, since without this set up, traffic orig-
inating from China will be directed to the company’s




An organization may own multiple AS numbers, and
chooses to advertise reachability to its prefixes from ASs
it owns. For example, AT&T advertises the same prefix
from three ASs it owns, namely 17228 17229 17227.
Another example is Safelink Internet, which advertises
the same prefix from two of its ASs; 33037 and 32444.
E. Multihoming
Multi-homing promotes reliability and also exposes a
network to different pricing models offered by various
tier-1 ISPs. For example, the Royal Bank of Canada,
which owns the prefix 192.234.99.0/24 and AS number
20069, is subscribed to both Sprint and AT&T. The
bank peers with Sprint using BGP and has an IGP link
with AT&T. Both Sprint and AT&T advertise the prefix
192.234.99.0/24. In a different example, an AS may
advertise a more specific prefix to a secondary ISP to
affect incoming traffic. We observe 220 occurrences of
such practice.
F. Data Centers
A content provider, say Corp-A, may locate its servers
at a company that specializes in providing high speed
and reliable data service. For example, to take advantage
of the services provided by the company Peer14, Corp-
A places its content servers at one of Peer1’s data
centers. Peer1 then advertises reachability to company-
A’s servers, which bear company A’s IP prefix. Hence,
resulting in a MOAS conflict.
G. Satellite Networks
Developing countries using satellite links to connect
to the Internet is another scenario that leads to MOAS
conflicts. Figure 8 shows a set up consisting of two
satellite links owned by AS-1 and AS-2 respectively, and
are used by country-A to gain access to the Internet.
To ensure connectivity to country-A, both ASs must
advertise reachability to prefix-A.
In a similar scenario, consider a company that wants
to keep its existing prefix, and does not run BGP. For
reliability or economic reasons, the company subscribes
to two ISPs, and advertise its prefixes to them using
IGP [2]. To ensure reachability, both ISPs advertise the
company’s prefix along with their own prefixes, which
result in MOAS conflicts. Certainly, there would be no
conflict if the company has a valid AS number and uses
BGP to peer with both ISPs.
4http://www.peer1.com
Fig. 8. A country connected to the Internet via satellite links.
H. Umbrella Organization
A parent organization that owns a large chunk of IP
addresses may divide its address space to one or more
child organizations; each with a valid AS number.
In one scenario, in the interest of reducing routing
table size, the parent organization may advertise aggre-
gates of its addresses. Since these aggregates encompass
its children’s address blocks, we see these advertisements
as MOAS conflicts.
In a different scenario, a child organization may decide
to peer with another ISP that is different to the one
providing service to the parent organization. In this
scenario, the parent and child network will advertise the
same address block, which result in a MOAS conflict.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 9, the parent organization’s
export policies may allow a child organization’s BGP
updates to flow through un-filtered, resulting in both the
parent and child AS advertising reachability to the same
prefix.
Fig. 9. An example of loose export policy of an umbrella organi-
zation.
I. Hijacks and Misconfigurations
MOAS conflicts are also caused by prefix hijacks
[8][1] and mis-configurations [7]. In the former, a rogue
AS may advertise a prefix belonging to another organi-
zation, in the hope of intercepting its traffic. Similarly,
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a mis-configuration causes unwanted incoming traffic.
Apart from that, prefixes can be hijacked to send out
spams [8]. In our study, we did not observe any evidence
of hijacks nor any mis-configurations.
V. CONCLUSION
Prefixes with MOAS conflicts consistute a small, but
growing, percentage of reachability information received
by routers. In this paper, we have analyzed their char-
acteristics, and discussed 10 reasons that explain their
occurrences.
Currently, we are developing a tool to visualize MOAS
conflicts. Apart from that, we are investigating reasons
that explain the short lifetime of MOAS conflicts.
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